

STATINTL

justified by the loss of precious lives in planes shot down and by the destruction of more than \$600 million cost value of our bombers and helicopters.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is neither frank nor honest in dealing with the American people. In his speeches he repeatedly says that if the Communists from the north would leave their neighbors to the south alone, we Americans would withdraw our forces. He was asked, at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate whether he would agree to the Vietcong being represented at peace talks. He refused to answer this question. He said he would have to consider it. Secretary Rusk's position is at variance with the recent public representations of President Johnson.

Of course the Vietcong or National Liberation Front, so called, must be represented by delegates at any conference seeking to end this conflict. The members of the National Liberation Front, so-called, or Vietcong are in control of nearly 75 percent of the land area of South Vietnam, whereas the Saigon government of Prime Minister Ky, controls only 25 percent of the land area of South Vietnam. We are involved with more than 200,000 men of our Armed Forces in a civil war in Vietnam.

The leader of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a Saigon lawyer. He is not a Communist. He was born and reared in South Vietnam. Prime Minister Ky, who was installed as dictator by 10 generals who revolted and maneuvered a coup overthrowing the civilian government of Prime Minister Quat, was born and reared in Hanoi, North Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Prime Minister Ky talks about his democratic government of South Vietnam. It is evident that he could not remain as Prime Minister of the Saigon Government for 1 week without the support of the CIA and of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Let us hope that the Vietnam question will be considered very soon in the United Nations or by reconvening the Geneva Conference of 1954. Vietnam is of no strategic importance to the defense of the United States.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch recently published an editorial, "The U.N.'s Hard Task in Vietnam." I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks.

Also, Mr. President, in the Washington Post of Tuesday, February 15, there appeared a very convincing column by Walter Lippmann entitled, "Confrontation With China." I commend this to my colleagues and ask that it also be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1966]

THE U.N.'S HARD TASK IN VIETNAM

In submitting the Vietnam question to the United Nations Security Council, President Johnson has done what for many months he declined to do. The reversal of policy is welcome, and all who want peace in southeast Asia will hope that the Security Council can find a way out of the morass.

If it is to do so with American help, another policy reversal will be required: we shall have to stop insisting that the Vietcong, who control two-thirds of South Vietnam, be excluded from peace talks and from the political future of the country.

Unfortunately the President has made the U.N.'s task extremely difficult by resuming the bombing of North Vietnam. That he rejected the counsel of Pope Paul, U Thant, and many others for extension of the bombing pause, at least for a period long enough to permit U.N. consideration of his request in a relatively calm atmosphere, can only be regarded as tragic.

Mr. Johnson says that resumed bombing is necessary to save the lives of American and South Vietnamese troops. The contention is difficult to accept in the absence of a showing that any lives were lost as a result of the 37-day suspension that ended Monday.

On the contrary, this was a period of unusually light operations by the Vietcong. It was a period when the United States continued its own troop buildup with impunity: 4,000 more marines, in addition to the 7,000 landed 2 weeks ago, went ashore only last Friday. It was a period when American air attacks throughout South Vietnam continued with unabated fury.

The President also hinges his decision on President Ho Chi Minh's letter of last Friday, which he interprets as total and unqualified rejection of his peace talks proposal. Yet as Marquis Childs reported in the Post-Dispatch, Ambassador Harriman was telling the dissent Senators on Thursday, before Ho's reply was broadcast, that the decision to resume bombing had already been made.

Ho's position, it seems to us, is subject to two interpretations. While he laid down unacceptable conditions for peace, such as American recognition of the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, he did not make these demands a condition for negotiations, and seemed to be opening a dialog on the President's 14 points as compared with his own 4 points. Mr. Johnson claims to base his 14 points on the Geneva agreements of 1954. Ho claims to base his 4 points on the same agreements. Clearly, the way to a political settlement lies in a reconciliation of the two programs calculated to apply the Geneva accords to the situation that now exists. In our view, Ho's letter did no necessarily rule out an ultimate settlement along those lines.

He did, however, seem to rule out the possibility of any political settlement so long as North Vietnam is under bombing attack. The resumption of bombing therefore would appear to make negotiations more difficult than ever to obtain. One must hope that the Security Council can overcome the difficulties, whether through Pope Paul's suggested arbitration procedure or otherwise.

The essentials of the problem remain what they were. Ho Chi Minh interprets American policy as determined to impose an anti-Communist puppet government on South Vietnam as a whole. The United States interprets Hanoi policy as determined to impose Communist rule upon South Vietnam as a whole. At the same time, the United States claims it wants no bases in Vietnam will accept neutrality, and favors free elections to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice. Ho Chi Minh, for his part, claims to want only "inde-

CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, President Johnson has stated repeatedly his desire is to negotiate for an armistice and cease-fire in Vietnam. He has submitted the Vietnam question to the United Nations Security Council. This action at long last is what he declined to do months ago. He has stated that there are no conditions attached to our efforts to sit down at a conference table to try to accomplish peace in Vietnam. He said he would go anywhere in the search for peace. Then he proposed that the Geneva Conference of 1954 could be reconvened and we would participate in this without conditions.

Unfortunately, these peace gestures were made by our President directly following the time he ordered a resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. This was poor timing, it seemed to me.

Furthermore, it is doubtful if the limited amount of destruction perpetrated in bombing targets in North Vietnam is

pendence, democracy, peace and neutrality" for South Vietnam.

In general, the stated objectives of both sides are within negotiable limits if each can be convinced that the other means what it says in terms of specifics. Somehow the United States must demonstrate that it is ready to accept Vietcong participation in the political future of South Vietnam, and Hanoi must demonstrate that it does not demand a Vietcong monopoly of that future.

An agreement based on these principles, and on the essentials of the Geneva accords, would correctly reflect the military realities, and pave the way for an end of intervention on both sides. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Security Council, despite the handicaps under which it now must labor, will be able to move both sides in this direction.

CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA (By Walter Lippmann)

The televised hearings, at which General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have done an inestimable service to our people. For they broke through the official screen and made visible the nature of the war and where our present policy is leading us. On the rule that if you cannot beat them, join them, which in its modern form is that if you cannot debate with them, say you agree with them, the President takes the position that there is not much difference between the Gavin-Kennan thesis and the Rusk-McNamara policy.

There is in fact a radical difference, the difference between a limited and an unlimited war. The President may not want to fight an unlimited war. I have no doubt myself that he does not want to do so. But the promises he made in Honolulu which the Vice President is now broadcasting so lavishly in Saigon and Bangkok, are—if they are to be taken seriously—an unlimited commitment of American soldiers and American money. It is this unlimited commitment which those of us who belong to the Gavin-Kennan school oppose. For we see that as the numbers of our troops and the range of our bombing are escalated, and as the theater of the war becomes widened, it is highly probable, indeed it is well nigh inevitable that the United States will find itself confronting China in a land war on the mainland of Asia.

Last week's hearings made visible that this is where the course we are taking leads. Congress and the people would be frivolous if they did not examine with the utmost seriousness how real, how valid, how significant is the hypothesis that the kind of war the Johnson administration is conducting is leading to a confrontation with China.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who since 1961 has played a leading part in our military intervention in South Vietnam, has recognized that the prospect of a land war with China is today our greatest worry. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, General Taylor is asked about the danger of "a military confrontation with Communist China." He replies that "one can never rule out the possibility. But I would list the probability quite low in terms of percentage."

This has an ominous resemblance to the colloquy in 1950 between President Truman and General MacArthur. (Cf. Lawson, "The United States in the Korean War," p. 79.) "In your opinion" President Truman asked General MacArthur, "is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?"

MacArthur shook his head. "I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river our Air Force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps

60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas."

At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking there were already more than a hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, the American, and other U.N. forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.

On the question of the need to contain the military expansion of Red China, there is virtually universal agreement in this country. The containment of Red China today, like the containment of Stalinist Russia after the World War, is necessary to the peace of the world and is a vital interest of the United States. What is debatable is the diplomatic policy we are pursuing in order to contain Red China. If we compare what Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy are doing with the diplomatic policy by which some 15 years ago Stalin was contained, the differences are very striking.

The cardinal difference is that our Chinese containment policy is a unilateral American policy, whereas our Stalinist containment policy was shared with and participated in by all the Western Allies. It is often said officially that in the Far East today we are repeating what was done so successfully in Europe. If this were what we are doing, there would be an alliance to contain China in which Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, the United States, Great Britain, and France were allied in a far eastern Marshall plan and NATO. Instead, owing to the miscalculations and blundering of the Vietnamese war, we have alienated and indeed neutralized all the great powers of the Asian mainland.

The difference between the two containment policies in Europe and in the Far East is the difference between realism and verbalism, between professionalism and amateurism. Our present policy is as if we had set out to contain Stalinist Russia by ignoring the British, the French, the Italians, and the Germans, and had decided to make our stand against communism by the defense of—let us say—Bucharest.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Ohio for the statement which he has just made and for his fearless leadership in the Senate on this foreign policy issue.

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